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Bob Weinberg

The Politics of Remembering: The Treatment
of the Holocaust in the Soviet Union

THESECONDWORLDWARWASTHEDEFININGMOMENTOFTHESOVIET

Union. The war extracted an incredible toll on the Soviet Union: more
than eight million soldiers and at least seventeen million civilians dead,
close to two thousand towns and seventy thousand villages razed to the
ground, and thirty thousand industrial enterprises destroyed. Millions
of Soviet citizens survived the war as homeless refugees, and many
others suffered permanent physical damage and lifelong psychological
trauma as a result of the hostilities. But the Red Army's triumphant
march into Berlin in late April 1945 and the unconditional surrender
of Germany on May 9 prompted many Soviet citizens to attribute victory over fascism to the policies of Stalin. The Soviet Union's heroic
effort to turn back the German invaders and then rout the enemy's
retreating troops proved the mettle not only of the Stalinist system
but also the Soviet people who collectively endured four years of war.
To many Soviets, the sacrifices and bloodletting that characterized
the building of socialism since the late 1920s had their payoff in the
Soviet Union's defeat of Germany. As one Soviet friend told me while
we watched fireworks televised on May 9, 1983, to commemorate
the thirty-eighth anniversary of Germany's surrender, "except for defeating Hitler and his army, we Soviets have nothing to be proud 0£"
Or consider the story told to me by an American colleague who,
while riding a bus in Moscow in 1983, witnessed the following scene.
An elderly woman, laden with several bags brimming over with potatoes and onions, boarded the crowded bus. She began berating a
twentysomething man who did not relinquish his seat, insisting that
she deserved a seat because she had liberated Berlin in 1945 just so
314 •
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he could live the good life in the early 1980s. At the same time, other
passengers-young, middle-aged and old, men and women, some
standing, some sitting-felt it was their civic duty to add their two
cents and joined the ad hominem attack on the man. After enduring
several minutes of this verbal lashing, the young man looked at the
woman and shouted, ''I've had enough talk about the war. I'm sick
and tired of hearing how you saved the Soviet Union. I didn't ask you
to march into Germany."
Similarly, the wartime experiences of those Soviet Jews who had
the good fortune to survive Germany's war of annihilation served
as a reference point for their post-1945 lives. As my elderly Russian
aunt responded when my wife inquired in 1995 how life in postCommunist Russia was treating her, "What can be bad about my life
now? The Germans aren't on their way, and there's no famine." Born in
1919, she spent most of the war years as an evacuee from Moscow in
a town near Lake Baikal, several thousand miles from the atrocities of
the Final Solution. Yet her comment underscores the extent to which
she has carried throughout her adult life the memories of the tragedy
that befell her country when she was a young woman. 1 Close to two
million of the nearly six million Jews killed by the Germans lived on
Soviet territory when the war broke out. Members ofthe Einsatzgruppen shot well over a million Jews, while hundreds ofthousands died in
ghettos, in transit to the camps, or in the extermination camps. Thus,
the history of the Holocaust is integrally linked to the history of Soviet
Jewry, and neither can be explored and understood in isolation.
Given the impact of the war on Soviet society, it is not surprising
that the Kremlin mobilized its resources to memorialize the Soviet
Union's heroic and triumphant efforts against Germany. A cottage
industry of books, films, plays, and public ceremonies developed in
the decades after 1945, reaching its apex in the late 1970s and early
1980s when the Brezhnev regime relied on the public commemoration of the war to provide the social and political cohesion that was
sorely in need of bolstering. 2 But when it came to addressing the
specifically anti-Jewish aspects of German policy and the particular
suffering experienced by Soviet Jews, Soviet historians were, for the
most part, silent. For a host of political reasons (as will be discussed),
the Soviet authorities instructed historians to refrain from mentioning
the specifically Jewish nature of the genocide carried out on Soviet
territory. Historians either overlooked the attempted extermination
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of Soviet Jewry or submerged the trauma suffered by Jews in a grocery
list of Soviet citizens of all nationalities and ethnicities who fell victim
to the German invaders. The flap over the memorial at Babi Yar is
undoubtedly the most publicized example of the Soviet Union's refusal
to acknowledge the Jewish genocide. As Zvi Gitelman, a leading expert
on the history of Soviet Jewry, asserts:
I know of no book published in the USSR that sought to explain
the Holocaust as sui generis. In fact, the term "Holocaust" is completely unknown in the Soviet literature. In discussions of the destruction of the Jews, terms "annihilation" (unichtozhenie) or "catastrophe" (katastrofa) have been used. It is only recently that the
"Holocaust," transliterated from English, has appeared. 3

Indeed, the scholarly interest in documenting and explaining the
Holocaust, so widespread in the United States, Israel, and Europe, was
virtually nonexistent during the Soviet era. One can search in vain
high school and college textbooks and official histories of the war for
any mention ofJews, anti-Semitism, and extermination camps.
Notwithstanding the desire to expunge from the historical record
any mention of Jews, the Kremlin did not adopt a consistent policy
of suppressing information about the Holocaust in the postwar era.
Indeed, Soviet scholars did not avoid the topic altogether. This essay
explores what Soviet historians wrote-and chose not to write-about
the Holocaust from 1945 to 1991 in an effort to uncover the political
and ideological calculus that shaped Soviet scholarship on the topic.
Information about the Holocaust was available to Soviet citizens both
during and after the war, though its amount and quality varied during
the post-1945 period. The remainder of this essay focuses on how Soviet treatment of the killing of some two million of its Jewish citizens
during World War II reflected the changing concerns of the Kremlin
between 194 5 and 1991. By American, Israeli, and Western European
standards, Soviet scholarship fell way short of providing a satisfactory
discussion and analysis of the Final Solution, and examination of the
political concerns of the Soviet leadership sheds light on the selective
memory of Soviet historians. 4
Contrary to those accounts that stress the ignorance of Soviet Jews
regarding what to expect from the Germans when they invaded in
June 1941, Mordechai Altshuler notes that Soviet Jews did have access
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to information about the German government's persecution of Jews
in countries under its control. 5 To be sure, no one inside the Soviet
Union could have known about the planned annihilation of Soviet
Jews because of the secrecy surrounding Operation Barbarossa. But
as Altshuler argues, unofficial channels of transmitting news coexisted
with the prohibition of publicizing the anti-Jewish policies of the
Germans in the official media that was in effect between the signing of
the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in mid-1939 and the outbreak
of the war nearly two years later. For example, the Soviet occupation
of eastern Poland in mid-September 1939 prompted hundreds of
thousands of Polish Jews with firsthand experience of German cruelty
to cross the new border into territory annexed by the Soviet Union.
The same holds for those Polish Jews who escaped the Germans by
seeking a safe haven in the Baltic countries that the Soviet Union annexed. Even after the Soviets and Germans sealed the borders of their
newly acquired territories, Jews still found it possible to cross over to
the Soviet Union with the help of smugglers. Many of these refugees
subsequently obtained Soviet citizenship and moved elsewhere in the
Soviet Union, where they told others of what life was like under the
Germans. Moreover, letters and other accounts from people caught in
German-controlled Poland still managed to find their way to friends
and relatives on the other side of the border. Altshuler concludes that
it "is hard to believe that this relatively large quantity of information,
flowing through diverse channels (individuals, letters, attestations),
remained hidden from very broad segments of the Jewish public." 6
Altshuler also notes that prior to September 1939, the official Soviet media published accounts of the mistreatment ofJews in Germany,
Austria, and Czechoslovakia. Articles appeared in the mainstream
Russian-language press such as Pravda and Izvestiia as well as the Yiddish newspaper Der Shtern, where details of attacks on Jews, incarceration in concentration camps, burning of synagogues, and destruction
of Jewish property were presented in graphic detail. The flow of this
information picked up after Kristallnacht in November 1938 and no
doubt served to make Soviet Jews aware of German brutality. In addition, the films Professor Mamlok and Ihe Family Oppenheim, Soviet
productions from 1938, were favorably reviewed by critics and ran in
theaters and factories until the signing of the nonaggression pact in
mid-1939 put an end to the appearance of negative news about the
Soviet Union's new ally. 7
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Not surprisingly, the Kremlin lifted the prohibition on official
information about the Germans' brutal treatment of Jews within
days of the German invasion. Articles about the Germans' anti-Jewish
atrocities quickly reappeared in the national and local press, and radio
stations aired shows describing the travails endured by Jews in territories under German control. Moreover, the Germans themselves
publicized what Soviet Jews could expect. Leaflets dropped from planes
and radio broadcasts disseminated German propaganda, advertising
the German military's intention to annihilate both Jews and Bolsheviks. In other words, neither the enemy nor the Soviet authorities
tried to conceal the fact that Jews were in a dire situation. Altshuler
concludes that "many Jews, before the German invasion of the Soviet
Union and afortiori afterward, were aware of the Nazis' discrimination
against and persecution of Jews (although they had no information
about genocide)." 8 To be sure, many civilians greeted such news with
skepticism and preferred to believe that reports of German brutality
were merely Kremlin propaganda. Still others, particularly those who
could remember the Great War, had trouble reconciling these reports
with their recollections of German rule a generation earlier. Finally,
those Jews who considered Soviet power as their chief enemy reasoned
that Hitler had to be a preferable ruler to Stalin. 9
For the duration of the war, Soviet authorities did not conceal
information about the genocide of the Jews. As Lukasz Hirszowicz
points out, "a considerable amount of material about the Holocaust
... appeared in the Soviet Union during the war and its immediate
aftermath."Io For example, the government instructed the writers Ilya
Ehrenburg and Vasily Grossman to lead a commission devoted to the
documentation of the German murder of Soviet Jewry. They printed
a typescript of their findings (known as the Black Book) in 1946, but
within a year the authorities decided to prohibit its publication because of the shift in the political and ideological climate. In 1948, the
Kremlin ordered the destruction of all copies of the manuscript, along
with the typescript, but the Black Book nonetheless soon appeared in
Hebrew and English translations because the manuscript had already
been sent abroad. An Israeli publisher also issued the Russian version,
but the fact remains that no version of the Black Book was published
in the Soviet Union. I I In addition, the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, established in the middle of the war in order to drum up foreign
support (financial and moral) for the Soviet Union, helped publicize
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the horrors of the Germans' concerted effort to kill all Soviet Jews. 12
Furthermore, details of the Nuremburg trials also appeared in the
official media. In a similar vein, the Russian and Yiddish versions of
the daily newspaper published in Birobidzhan, capital of the Jewish
Autonomous Oblast, printed letters from displaced Soviet Jews who
survived the German onslaught and were seeking a new life in Birobidzhan, the putative national enclave of Soviet Jewry. The Jewish theater
troupe ofBirobidzhan staged the production of He Is from the Ghetto,
a play about the Jewish uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto. 13
Notwithstanding these events, the suppression of the Black Book
signaled the Kremlin's growing ambivalence and discomfort with any
specific mention of the Holocaust. Undoubtedly, the anti-Semitic hysteria that had begun to characterize certain aspects of Stalin's domestic
and foreign policies, and reached a crescendo in the campaign against
"rootless cosmopolitans" and the Doctors' Plot during Stalin's final
years, certainly played a role in the decision to downplay the special
nature of the Germans' treatment of the Jews. 14 But several other issues
merit consideration in any explanation of why the Soviet authorities
silenced discussion of the Holocaust in the Soviet Union. First, publication and discussion of these materials, especially those compiled
by Ehrenburg and Grossman, raised the very uncomfortable issue
of collaboration by Soviet citizens, particularly those Ukrainian and
Latvian civilians who assisted the Germans in their slaughter ofJews.
The fact that significant numbers of Soviet citizens were traitors to the
Soviet cause threw into doubt the Kremlin's claim that the Communist
regime enjoyed the unconditional support of the populace. 15
Second, the Soviet authorities realized that social and political
cohesion would be better served by not treating the Jewish genocide
as a unique phenomenon. As Solomon Schwarz noted more than fifty
years ago, the Kremlin worried that highlighting Hitler's belief that the
war against the Soviet Union stemmed from his war against the Jews
would weaken "civilian and military morale." 16 In a sad commentary
on the persistence of popular anti-Semitism, the Soviet leadership
worried that non-Jewish Soviets would be susceptible to German
propaganda and blame the Jews for the horrors visited upon all Soviet
citizens, thereby weakening their resolve to combat the enemy. Put
bluntly, the Kremlin did not want Soviet citizens to believe they were
fighting to protect the Jews. It is therefore not surprising that already
during the war the Soviet authorities took efforts to minimize the
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unique nature of the Germans' campaign to exterminate Soviet Jewry.
For example, they instructed the commission set up to gather evidence
of the Germans' murder of Jews to omit any mention that Jews were
the victims. The Kremlin also told the commission to minimize the
role played by Soviet citizens who collaborated with the Germans in
the mass shootings and massacres ofJews. 17
Finally, the elation with which many Soviet Jews greeted the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948 and the enthusiastic
welcome accorded Golda Meir, head of the Israeli legation that visited
Moscow in the fall, bolstered suspicions among many in the Kremlin
that Soviet Jewry was not loyal to the Soviet Union. In addition, the
rising tide of official anti-Semitic policies and pronouncements gave
many Soviet Jews good reason to take pride in Israel, particularly
because they could not but notice that the regime had deliberately
turned its back on them and had no interest in examining the wartime
travails of Soviet Jewry. 18
By the end of the 1940s, this tendency to avoid mentioning the
German effort to annihilate Soviet Jewry had become the norm and
remained as such until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
The overwhelming number of books published about the war years,
from memoirs and novels to document collections and monographs,
maintained a silence regarding the genocide of Soviet Jews. In one
incident, the Soviet censors excised from the diary of a Jewish girl who
endured ghetto life any mention of her Jewishness. 19 Yet it bears noting
that the Soviets never denied that the Germans murdered six million
Jews. Nor did they deny that the Germans targeted European Jewry
for extermination. Instead, Soviet treatments tended to conflate the
victimization of Soviet Jewry with the sufferings endured by all Soviet
citizens. Such an approach demystified the Holocaust and eliminated
the need to explain the mass murder of six million Jews because the Final Solution "was seen as an integral part of a larger phenomenon-the
murder of civilians-whether Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians,
Gypsies, or other nationalities. It was said to be a natural consequence
of racist fascism," which in turn was the inevitable consequence of the
paroxysms of capitalism in its death throes. 20 In other words, Soviet
treatments of the war years universalized the murder of Soviet Jews,
relegating them to a place on the list of Soviet victims of fascism and
at times even erasing any mention of their Jewishness. It was common
practice to refer to Jewish resistance fighters, soldiers, and victims as
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"Soviet," thereby conveying the impression that Jews were not special
targets of the Germans and may not have distinguished themselves
in combat. From the perspective of the ideologues in the Kremlin,
there was no need to point out what Jews experienced during the war,
especially if the sense ofJewish victimhood could fuel Jewish national
feelings and foster a sense of entitlement. The authorities also worried that underscoring the Jewish nature of the Final Solution could
spark resentment among non-Jewish Soviets who also suffered at the
hands of the Germans. All Soviet citizens were targets of Germany's
racial profiling during the war, especially ethnic Russians, and Jews
found themselves mentioned along with the myriad nationalities and
ethnicities that also endured Germany's campaign for Lebensraum and
destruction of communism.
Stalin's death in 1953 did very little to alter the general approach
of Soviet treatments of the Holocaust. Still, this does not mean that
all mention ofJews, including even highlighting the special treatment
meted out to Jews, vanished. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet media
did not shy away from covering war crimes trials conducted in West
Germany and even the Soviet Union. Along with the fascination
generated by the capture and trial of Adolf Eichmann in the early
1960s, the specific nature of these trials made it difficult to avoid
mention of the Jewish victims. In addition, Sovetish heymland, the
Yiddish monthly published in Moscow from 1961 to 1991, saw fit
to print stories, poems, memoirs, and documentary material on the
Holocaust in "almost every issue." 21 But how many Soviet citizens, Jews
and non-Jews, could read Yiddish? Only a few publications appeared
in the post-Stalin years that offered honest assessments of the Final
Solution on Soviet territory, with explicit attention paid to the Jewish
ghettos and mass executions of Soviet Jews. 22 Still, the vast majority
of publications erased any mention of the Jewishness of Soviet victims
from the historical record.
However, it is the controversy over building a monument to
the thirty-three thousand Jews of Kiev murdered at Babi Yar in
September 1941 that best illustrates the desire to downplay public
recognition of the Holocaust. The public clamor to erect a memorial
at Babi Yar crystallized a movement demanding that the Kremlin
acknowledge the existence of anti-Semitism and commemorate the
murder of thirty-three thousand Soviet Jews. With his poem "Babi
Yar," the poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko in the early 1960s catapulted
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the issue onto the world stage, opening a festering wound that Soviet
society had been living with for nearly twenty years. The worldfamous Dmitry Shostakovich also added his imprimatur to the incident by including Yevtushenko's poem in his Thirteenth Symphony
and thereby earning the wrath of the authorities, who prohibited
public performances of the composition for several years. While
Yevtushenko and his supporters prevailed by convincing the Kremlin to establish a memorial at Babi Yar, their victory was a hollow
one and fell short of what they wanted. The inscription refers to the
one hundred thousand "citizens of Kiev and prisoners of war" who
perished at the hands of German soldiers in 1941 and 1942 at Babi
Yar. The authorities obviously did not want to sanctify Babi Yar as
a site of Jewish victimization because doing so would run against
the grain of policy and threaten to offend the sensibilities of nonJewish Soviet citizens who also lost friends and relatives at Babi Yar.
And when the Kremlin authorized performances of Shostakovich's
Thirteenth Symphony, Yevtushenko first had to amend the poem
to include mention of Russian and Ukrainian victims and highlight
how Russia resisted the Germans. Not surprisingly, the authorities'
decision inflamed Jewish sensibilities both inside and outside the
Soviet Union, and the controversy continued until the end of the
Communist regime. In the late 1980s, the city fathers added another
plaque to the memorial. Written in Yiddish, the plaque amazingly
does not mention Jews. It was only after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and the emergence of Ukraine as an independent country
in 1991 that a fitting memorial commemorating the Jewish victims
at Babi Yar was erected. This new memorial was in the shape of a
menorah with Yiddish and Hebrew texts that refer to Jews. But it is
located at a spot some distance from the original monument. 23
The dissolution of the Soviet Union changed the political calculus
of the successor states, including the Russian Federation, offering
historians and politicians alike a chance to reconsider their countries'
wartime experiences, especially in terms of their relationships toward
Jews and Germans. But the collapse of communism did not mean
that discussion of the Holocaust became depoliticized throughout the
former Soviet Union. To the contrary, in some countries examination
of what happened to Jews during World War II remained a sensitive
and contentious matter, particularly when it intersected with the ef-
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forts of these newly independent states to reverse the effects of decades
of Moscow rule. For example, Zvi Gitelman notes that in September
1991 the Lithuanian government, soon after the Kremlin recognized
its independence, pardoned close to one thousand Lithuanians whom
postwar Soviet tribunals found guilty of collaborating with the Germans. The approach adopted by the Lithuanian government was simple
and direct: any Lithuanian judged guilty by the Soviet authorities must
have been innocent. Not unexpectedly, Israeli and Jewish observers of
these events protested and convinced the government to reconsider
the rehabilitation of the collaborators. The government also established a joint commission of experts from Israel, the United States,
and Lithuania to examine the records and trials of the convicted collaborators. But resolution of the issue has not been reached, largely
because American and Israeli members of the commission refused to
accept the Lithuanian proposal that equates Jewish and Lithuanian
suffering during and after the war. In addition, the proposal also tries
to expunge from the historical record the responsibility of Lithuania
for the genocide of the Jews. 24
Clearly, then, the issue of collaboration still resonates in the former Soviet Union, not only affecting Jewish-gentile relations but also
highlighting the political capital that the Holocaust still possesses.
For example, in Ukraine a number ofindependent Jewish researchers
studying the fate of Ukrainian Jews during the war have published
historical accounts of the Final Solution based on documents and interviews with survivors. But as Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern points out
in a recent essay, these researchers affix responsibility for the atrocities
to Ukrainian nationalists who collaborated with the Germans. Furthermore, Petrovsky-Shtern believes that these independent scholars
use the study of the Holocaust as a way to "attain political and social
importance within the Jewish community and attract the attention
of the Ukrainian authorities; ... Holocaust studies are used as an instrument of struggle for power in the Jewish community in Ukraine
at large." 25 In contrast to this self-serving effort to blame Ukrainian
extremists as the instigators of the Final Solution, a group of presumably non-Jewish scholars connected to official institutions revert to
the scholarly practices of the Soviet period and make no mention of
the role of Ukrainian collaborators. According to Petrovsky-Shtern,
a disturbing revisionist trend has emerged that seeks to sweep under
the carpet the participation of Ukrainians in the Final Solution and
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promote a view of Ukrainian history in which Jews and Ukrainians
lived in friendly, peaceful coexistence. 26
On the other hand, since the early 1990s, the government of independent Ukraine has been sincerely trying to rectify the mistakes of
the past. In Ukraine, where large numbers of Ukrainians collaborated
with the Germans in liquidating ghettos, rounding up and executing Jews, and fighting the Red Army, the Ukrainian government has
made a concerted effort to mend Jewish-Ukrainian relations. The
government has helped sponsor annual commemorations of the Babi
Yar massacre and has rejected the relativization of the Holocaust that
characterized Soviet treatments of the subject. 27 In addition, officials in
many of the major centers ofJewish residence during the Soviet period
helped sponsor conferences, memorials, public gatherings, and other
events commemorating the Holocaust. 28 Finally, Alfonsas Eidintas,
Lithuania's ambassador to Israel in 2001, has edited a collection of
documents and articles on the Holocaust in Lithuanian by prominent
Lithuanian intellectuals of various political stripes. 29
In post-Soviet Russia, the end of Communist rule provided favorable conditions for a burgeoning field of Holocaust studies. By the
mid-1990s, local centers devoted to the study of the Holocaust had
sprouted up, often at the behest of professional historians interested
in publishing and educating the public about the genocide of Soviet
Jews. The Center for Research and Education on the Holocaust, located in Moscow, established a series entitled The Russian Library of
the Holocaust 30 and published the papers from a 1994 international
symposium entitled Lessons of the Holocaust and Contemporary Russia. 31 Under the direction ofllyaAltman, the center has issued several
document collections pertaining to the Holocaust, including one
designed for pre-university-level teachers entitled Istoriia Kholokosta,
1933-1945 gg.: Paket-komplekt dokumental'nykh materialov (1995).
Edited by D. I. Poltorak, the documents, which include selections from
Hitler's Mein Kampf, along with diaries, memoirs, statistical records,
official SS reports, and assorted photographs, come with lesson plans
replete with discussion questions and possible assignments. The center
has also organized traveling exhibitions and helped train teachers. In
addition, the Institute ofJewish Studies in Kiev promotes research on
the Holocaust in Ukraine. 32
At the same time, the opening of the archives of the former Soviet
Union and the ability of archivists at Yad Vashem in Israel and the

This content downloaded from
192.157 .0.130 on Mon, 30 Aug 2021 16:48:49 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/tenns

THE POLITICS OF REMEMBERING

• 325

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum to microfilm materials
from these repositories has been a boon to the study of the Holocaust
on Soviet territory. Several journals from Russia, England, Israel, and
the United States publish on a regular basis articles written by scholars
from the former Soviet Union who utilize documents preserved
in archives in Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, and the Baltic states. 33 In addition, Jewish Soviet war veterans have undertaken efforts to preserve
the historical memory of the Holocaust, and Jewish researchers have
published memorial books about the vanished Jewish communities.
Complementing this flurry of interest in the Holocaust is the publication of books and articles by scholars investigating the Kremlin's
policies toward Jews before, during, and after the war. Still, the ability
to publish openly on the Holocaust has not led scholars in the former
Soviet Union to break significant new ground and offer fresh analyses
of the genocide of Soviet Jews.
Despite the recent advances, the dissemination of information
about the Holocaust in the Soviet Union lags behind the explosive
growth of Holocaust studies in the United States and elsewhere. Material on the Holocaust tends to appear in publications issued by Jewish
organizations whose readership is primarily the small circle of scholars
interested in the Final Solution in the Soviet Union. In addition, some
of the articles that have appeared are Russian translations of articles
written by American, English, and Israeli scholars. The following
incident underscores the failure of the Soviet academic establishment
to address the tragedy of the Holocaust. In July 1995, I spent some of
my spare time perusing recent publications about Soviet history and
World War II, interested in learning what the spate of books commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war contained
about the Holocaust. I browsed the offerings of the major bookstores
in the city and came up empty-handed.
However, a more recent endeavor in May 2003 revealed that
historians are now paying attention to the Holocaust in general and
the killing of Soviet Jews in particular. For example, a textbook on
the history of the Soviet Union designed for high school and college
students offers a concise but accurate discussion of the genocide of
Soviet Jews. Not only do the authors of the text note that Germany's
war aims targeted "Jewish Bolshevism," but they assert that the German
invasion of the Soviet Union coincided with the decision regarding the
Final Solution. More significant is the authors' decision to underscore
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how many Soviet citizens, "especially those with strong antisemitic
feelings," collaborated with the Germans. Unfortunately, the authors
offer discredited information such as when they (on the one hand)
assert that four million persons died at Auschwitz-Birkenau and (on
the other hand) underestimate the number of Soviet Jews who perished
at the hands of the Germans. 34 In addition, an April 2003 issue of
Novoe vremia, the Russian equivalent of Newsweek or Time, published
two articles discussing the Warsaw Ghetto and the 1943 uprising as
well as the silence of Soviet historians regarding these events. 35 So it
seems as if the Russian public is slowly but gradually receiving exposure to the history of the Holocaust, though it bears noting that a
2001 textbook on the history of Russia, also designed for high school
and college students, does not mention the Holocaust or the fate of
European and Soviet Jewry. 36
Still, the progress post-Soviet scholars have made since the early
1990s is commendable and augurs well for the future treatment of
the Holocaust. As historians reexamine and revise the old Soviet historiography of World War II, they will find it difficult to avoid giving
the Final Solution on Soviet soil the attention that is long overdue.
The national consolidation of the newly independent countries of the
former Soviet Union will no doubt proceed apace and alleviate the
perceived need to hold an honest assessment of the Holocaust hostage
to the politics of nation building. One can hope that a more open and
accurate reckoning of the Holocaust will prevail in the scholarship of
historians working in the former Soviet Union.
NOTES
1. Questionnaires conducted in the 1990s indicate that remembrance
of the Holocaust is a crucial element of identity among Jews in Russia and
Ukraine. See Zvi Gitelman, "Thinking About Being Jewish in Russia and
Ukraine," in Jewish Life After the USSR, ed. Zvi Gitelman (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2003), 49-60; and Zvi Gitelman, Valeriy Chervyakov, and Vladimir Shapiro, "E Pluribus Unum? Post-Soviet Identities and
Their Implications for Communal Reconstruction," in Gitelman Jewish
Life After USSR, 61-75.
2. See Nina Tumarkin, 7he Living and the Dead: 1he Rise and Fall ofthe
Cult ofWorld War in Russia (New York: Basic Books, 1994), for an insightful analysis.
3. Zvi Gitelman, "Politics and the Historiography of the Holocaust in
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the Soviet Union" in Bitter Legacy: Confronting the Holocaust in the USSR,
ed. Zvi Gitelman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 18-19.
4. For accounts of the genocide of Soviet Jewry, see the essays, many
of them excellent, in Gitelman, Bitter Legacy; and Lucjan Dobroszycki and
Jeffrey S. Gurock, eds., 1he Holocaust in the Soviet Union: Studies and Sources

on the Destruction ofthe Nazi-Occupied Territories ofthe USSR, 1941-1945
(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993). In addition, see Nora Levin, 1he fews
in the Soviet Union Since 1917, 2 vols. (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988).
5. Mordechai Altshuler, "Escape and Evacuation of Soviet Jews at the
Time of the Nazi Invasion: Policies and Realities," in Dobroszycki and Gurock, Holocaust in the Soviet Union, 77-104.
6. Ibid., 85.
7. Ibid., 84.
8. Ibid., 89.
9. Ibid.
10. Lukasz Hirszowicz, "The Holocaust in the Soviet Union," in Dobroszycki and Gurock, Holocaust in the Soviet Union, 31.
11. Gitelman, "Politics and Historiography," p. 19.
12. On the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, see Shimon Redlich, War,

Holocaust and Stalinism: A Documentary Study oftheJewish Anti-Fascist Committee in the USSR (Luxembourg: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1995);
Shimon Redlich, Propaganda and Nationalism in Wartime Russia: 1heJewish
Anti-Fascist Committee in the USSR, 1941-1948 (Boulder, CO: East European Quarterly, 1982); Joshua Rubenstein, ed., Stalin's Secret Pogrom: 1he
Postwar Inquisition oftheJewish Anti-Fascist Committee (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2001); Gennadi Kostyrchenko, V plenu u krasnogo Faraona
(Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1994); Gennadi Kostyrchenko,
Tainaia politika Stalinia: vlast' I antisemitizm (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye
Otnosheniia, 2001); Arkadii Vaksberg, Stalin Against the Jews (New York:
Knopf, 1994).
13. Robert Weinberg, "Jewish Revival in Birobidzhan in the Mirror of
Birobidzhanskaya zvezda, 1946-49 ," East European Jewish Affairs 26, no. 1
(1996): 35-53.
14. See the books by Rubenstein and Kostyrchenko and Yehoshua
Gilboa, 1he Black Years ofSoviet Jewry, 1939-1953 (Boston: Little, Brown,
1971).
15. For a fascinating analysis of the regime's attitudes and policies toward traitors, see Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: 1he Second Wor/,d War
and the Fate ofthe Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2001).
16. Solomon Schwarz, 1he Jews in the Soviet Union (Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University Press, 1951), 200.
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17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Gitelman, "Politics and Historiography," 21.
Schwarz.fews in Soviet Union, 198-201.
Gitelman, "Politics and Historiography," 24.
Ibid., 18.
Ibid., 25.
For example, see P. P. Lipilo and V. F. Romanovskii, eds., Prestupleniia
nemetskofashistikikh okkupantov v belorussii, 1941-1944 (Minsk, 1965);
and V. I. Vinogradov, lstoriia SSR v dokumentakh I illustratskikh (Moscow,
1981).
23. On the controversy over Babi Yar, see William Korey, "A Monument Over Babi Yar?" in Dobroszycki and Gurock, Holocaust in the Soviet
Union, 61-74; and Gitelman, "Politics and the Historiography," 20-21. A
similar controversy broke out when Anatoly Kuznetsov published his novel
Babi ¼r in the mid- I 960s.
24. Gitelman, "Politics and Historiography," 32-33.
25. Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, "The Revival of Academic Studies of
Judaica in Independent Ukraine," in Gitelman,Jewish Life After the USSR,
160-61.
26. Ibid., 158-59, 161.
27. Gitelman, "Politics and Historiography," 34.
28. Ibid., 32.
29. Alfonsas Eidintas, ed., Lietuvos zydu zudyniu byla: Dokumentu ir

strapsniu rinkinys ( 1he Case ofthe Massacre ofLithuanian Jews: Selected Documents and Articles) (Vilnius: Vaga Publishing House, 2001).
30. The Jewish Heritage Society in Moscow (http:/ /www.jewish-heritage
.org) serves as an umbrella organization for many of the organizations devoted
to the study of Jewish history and culture in the former Soviet Union. It
publishes the research findings of historians studying the Holocaust on Soviet
territory and is a partner with the Center for Research and Education on the
Holocaust. The Jewish Heritage Society's Web site has an English-language
list of its publications and activities.
31. The book contains remarks by Boris Yeltsin, who welcomed the
symposium's participants and paid "tribute to the feat ofthe army ofliberators
who saved the Jews of Europe from full extermination." M. I. Gefter and I.
Altman, eds., Uroki kholokosta i sovremennaia Rossiia (Moscow: Nauchnoprosvetotel'nyi tsentr "Kholokost," 1995). My translation.
32. See the Institute of Jewish Studies Web site, http://www.judaica
.kiev.ua.
33. The list of journals includes Vestnik evreiskogo universiteta v Moskve,
Jews in Eastern Europe (formerly Jews andJewish Life in Eastern Europe), East
European Jewish Affairs, and Genocide and Holocaust Studies.
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34. A. K. Sokolov and V. S .Tiazhel'nikov, Kurs sovetskoi istorii, 19411991 (Moscow: Vysshaia Shkola, 1999), 4-5, 48-49.
35. Iakov Ettinger, "Bunt obrechennykh," Novoe vremia 16 (April 20,
2003): 35; Petr Gorelik, "Krepost' masada v Varshave," Novoe vremia 16
(April 20, 2003): 37.
36. A. P. Derevianko and N. A. Shabel' nikov, Istoriia Rossii s drevneskikh
vremeni do kontsa XX veka, 2nd edition (Moscow, 2001).
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